In his philosophical works, Frankfurt clearly defines the extent of Freedom of Will and Freedom of Action. His definition of Freedom of Will involves the second-order volitions of an individual aligning with the first-order desires. Consequently, if an individual has a second-order volition that something be his will, it will be, and if not, it won’t be his will. With respect to Freedom of Action, it is of similar construction to the Freedom of Will. If an individual chooses to do something, he will, and if he chooses not to do something, he will not. These largely inclusive categories of freedom give rise to Frankfurt’s claim that to have both sorts of freedom is “to have all the freedom it is possible to desire and conceive” (Frankfurt). Through the review of Frankfurt’s definitions of Freedom of Will and Freedom of Action, Frankfurt is incorrect in saying that there is no more freedom that is possible or desirable.
The fault of his argument lies in his explication of the wanton. This individual is characterized as only having first-order desires. In lecture, we concluded that the wanton is a creature that is indifferent to what kind of will it has. For example, they might want to go to the gym, but is indifferent about his health and doesn’t care about wanting to go to the gym. By Frankfurt’s distinction, the wanton cannot experience free will, but it can experience freedom of action. Although this may be true, the wanton class gives rise to a form of freedom that Frankfurt ignores: the Freedom of Thought.
Identified as a rational being, wantons “engage in means-end reasoning and sacrifice near-term pleasure for long-term gain” (Hopp). The term of wanton, and the less than flattering description of their freedom makes them seem similar to a robot-like being that merely engages in the most pleasurable things for itself. In reality, wantons can, in fact, desire some of the higher-order desires that other philosophers have romantically alluded to. When discussing their rationality, wantons are able to contemplate decisions and weigh the best possible outcome for themselves. Their ability to contemplate and develop an opinion about issues at hand give way to a freedom of thought that is not previously mentioned, or included in Frankfurt’s theory of complete freedom. Although wantons do not care about what makes them act a certain way, they are still able to reason and think freely in any given situation.
In opposition, critics may claim that freedom of thought would fall under Frankfurt’s principles of a complete freedom. When analyzing this further, it seems that freedom of thought could not be classified under the freedom of action principle. Since there is no action being performed or conducted, it does not fit within the confines of freedom of action. From this conclusion, one could say that this freedom of thought could be classified under the theory of freedom of will. This in itself would be a contradiction and would nullify Frankfurt’s claim that wantons do not have the freedom of will. In addition, freedom of thought differs greatly from the freedom of will. Freedom of will implies that a first-order desire drives one to perform an action because it’s second-order desire align with it. Freedom of thought doesn’t necessarily imply that action will take place. This is merely the freedom to evaluate decisions before one even chooses to act. Due to the lack of actions that follow, this cannot be evaluated at an aspect of freedom of action or will.
To clear up the complexity of this claim, an example is needed to illustrate the role of freedom of thought in an applicable situation. For example, a wanton can be pressed with the dilemma of how to spend a Sunday afternoon. After evaluating his choices, he decides to go to the gym because he merely has the first order desire to do so. He chooses this option because, in some way, it is the most advantageous for him. The act of evaluation serves as a prerequisite to any action. Since, a wanton, by Frankfurt’s rules, cannot have the freedom of will, this freedom of thought is their way of evaluating choices before they exercise their freedom of action. It seems as if this freedom of thought serves as a “stand-in” for the freedom of will that they cannot possess or exercise.
To conclude, the ignorance of the freedom of thought in Frankfurt’s claim invalidates it. For wantons that cannot experience the freedom of will, freedom of thought is crucial to their everyday lives. As functioning beings that have a rational capacity, they need to evaluate situations to determine their actions, even if they are of the first-order nature. Although freedom of thought is somewhat of a minor form of freedom, it is still essential to the “necessary freedoms of an individual” that Frankfurt classifies.
Work Cited:
Frankfurt, Harry. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” Free Will. Ed. Derk Pereboom. Hacket: Cambridge, 2009. 196-212. Print
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