Friday, April 22, 2011

Freedom of Thought: What Frankfurt Forgot


In his philosophical works, Frankfurt clearly defines the extent of Freedom of Will and Freedom of Action.  His definition of Freedom of Will involves the second-order volitions of an individual aligning with the first-order desires.  Consequently, if an individual has a second-order volition that something be his will, it will be, and if not, it won’t be his will.  With respect to Freedom of Action, it is of similar construction to the Freedom of Will.  If an individual chooses to do something, he will, and if he chooses not to do something, he will not.  These largely inclusive categories of freedom give rise to Frankfurt’s claim that to have both sorts of freedom is “to have all the freedom it is possible to desire and conceive” (Frankfurt).  Through the review of Frankfurt’s definitions of Freedom of Will and Freedom of Action, Frankfurt is incorrect in saying that there is no more freedom that is possible or desirable. 
            The fault of his argument lies in his explication of the wanton.  This individual is characterized as only having first-order desires.  In lecture, we concluded that the wanton is a creature that is indifferent to what kind of will it has.  For example, they might want to go to the gym, but is indifferent about his health and doesn’t care about wanting to go to the gym.  By Frankfurt’s distinction, the wanton cannot experience free will, but it can experience freedom of action.  Although this may be true, the wanton class gives rise to a form of freedom that Frankfurt ignores: the Freedom of Thought. 
            Identified as a rational being, wantons “engage in means-end reasoning and sacrifice near-term pleasure for long-term gain” (Hopp).  The term of wanton, and the less than flattering description of their freedom makes them seem similar to a robot-like being that merely engages in the most pleasurable things for itself.  In reality, wantons can, in fact, desire some of the higher-order desires that other philosophers have romantically alluded to.  When discussing their rationality, wantons are able to contemplate decisions and weigh the best possible outcome for themselves.  Their ability to contemplate and develop an opinion about issues at hand give way to a freedom of thought that is not previously mentioned, or included in Frankfurt’s theory of complete freedom.  Although wantons do not care about what makes them act a certain way, they are still able to reason and think freely in any given situation. 
            In opposition, critics may claim that freedom of thought would fall under Frankfurt’s principles of a complete freedom.  When analyzing this further, it seems that freedom of thought could not be classified under the freedom of action principle.  Since there is no action being performed or conducted, it does not fit within the confines of freedom of action.  From this conclusion, one could say that this freedom of thought could be classified under the theory of freedom of will.  This in itself would be a contradiction and would nullify Frankfurt’s claim that wantons do not have the freedom of will.  In addition, freedom of thought differs greatly from the freedom of will.  Freedom of will implies that a first-order desire drives one to perform an action because it’s second-order desire align with it.  Freedom of thought doesn’t necessarily imply that action will take place.  This is merely the freedom to evaluate decisions before one even chooses to act.  Due to the lack of actions that follow, this cannot be evaluated at an aspect of freedom of action or will. 
            To clear up the complexity of this claim, an example is needed to illustrate the role of freedom of thought in an applicable situation.  For example, a wanton can be pressed with the dilemma of how to spend a Sunday afternoon.  After evaluating his choices, he decides to go to the gym because he merely has the first order desire to do so.  He chooses this option because, in some way, it is the most advantageous for him.  The act of evaluation serves as a prerequisite to any action.  Since, a wanton, by Frankfurt’s rules, cannot have the freedom of will, this freedom of thought is their way of evaluating choices before they exercise their freedom of action.  It seems as if this freedom of thought serves as a “stand-in” for the freedom of will that they cannot possess or exercise. 
            To conclude, the ignorance of the freedom of thought in Frankfurt’s claim invalidates it.  For wantons that cannot experience the freedom of will, freedom of thought is crucial to their everyday lives.  As functioning beings that have a rational capacity, they need to evaluate situations to determine their actions, even if they are of the first-order nature.  Although freedom of thought is somewhat of a minor form of freedom, it is still essential to the “necessary freedoms of an individual” that Frankfurt classifies.   
Work Cited:
Frankfurt, Harry. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” Free Will. Ed. Derk Pereboom. Hacket: Cambridge, 2009. 196-212. Print 

Sunday, February 20, 2011

Moral Significance: An Argument for Materialism


            Promoting charity has led to a barrage of infomercials, telemarketing phone calls, and fliers in the mail in the past few decades.  We are used to seeing the familiar images of an emaciated child from a token third-world country in tattered clothes wandering the streets.  As the soothing, yet grave voice of a ruggedly dressed man narrates the misfortune of this child, we are given statistics about how a nickel a day would clothe, educate, and medically treat him or her.  As the average consumer is bombarded with these pleas on a daily basis, the message that is trying to be conveyed comes off as a more forceful suggestion of moral responsibility than a generous choice.  Peter Singer, author of “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” advocates for the moral responsibility of individuals to give to charity.  In his argument, the extent of charity should be as generous as possible until a point is reached in which “anything of comparable moral importance” is put in jeopardy (Singer 437).  Due to the intrinsic values of self-esteem, the purchases in context to this principle are justified and should be protected under Singer’s view of morally significant. 
            From the start of Singer’s poignant essay, he displays the prevalent issue of suffering and death in East Bengal as a recent issue to base his argument off of.  Through the discussion of this particular situation, he claims, “suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad” (Singer 437).  After accepting this as widespread belief, he then states that, as affluent nations, we morally should prevent wrongs of this nature from happening.  By discounting the concerns of proximity and influencing solidarity of action, Singer aims to captivate a universal audience. 
            Through acts of condemnation, the author disapproves of the concept of “charity” because he believes that aid to those in need is a morally responsibility.  When recollecting on past thoughts he also authoritatively states that we should give money away because buying clothes that don’t keep us warm are a waste and “to do so is not charitable, or generous” (Singer 440).  Following his full-fledged attack on materialistic endeavors and finding no purpose in “wasteful purchases,” he proposes a battery of solutions.  Most involve the concept of sacrificing until jeopardizing something of comparable moral significance, but they differ slightly in theory.  Although he brands this theory as his most moderate proposal, the implications of discounting all materialistic endeavors are debatable. 
            The far most debatable hinge of Singer’s argument is the phrase, “comparably morally significant.”  Due to the ambiguity of the term “comparable,” it does not apply to my specific argument.  Individuals have a set of values and beliefs that dictate their actions that are specific to them.  Since these values are harbored within the specific individual, their values consequently differ from person to person.  Therefore, one individual’s conception of comparable would consequently differ from another individual’s conception.  The potential of this term to be interpreted in a multitude of ways would ultimately undermine the integrity of my argument.  Introducing the term would offer an air of subjectivity that might lead critics to discount the argument before digesting it as a whole; Therefore, I will be arguing that some purchases in context to self-esteem are morally significant. 
            In addition to the ambiguity of “comparable,” the concept of what is morally significant is also vague.  While for some it is invested in education, and financial security among other expenditures, for others, it simply means the bare minimum.  Factors such as education, transportation, healthcare, retirement, and insurance are all scrutinized in the eye of the beholder and are assigned some sort of value according to their beliefs.  Although there are a multitude of factors that influence peoples’ view of what constitutes moral significance, we all are social beings and invest belief in the interaction with peers.  One cannot fathom a day without interaction of some kind with another person.  As humans, we need to converse with others, share ideas, give praise, be recognized, and be praised in return in order to feel good about ourselves.  These basic principles that we take for granted are invested in the concept of self-esteem. 
            Serving as an evaluation of the self, self-esteem is an accurate gauge of one’s worth that is inferred from external factors.  Many psychologists, such as Maslow, have placed self-esteem on a pedestal and have defended its purpose for integral reasons.        This psychological concept dictates the consequent moods and actions of the individual throughout life.  As social beings, the discourse with others and their subsequent evaluation, or external factors, which occur, influences our self-esteem drastically.  Based on an individual’s beliefs, appearance and thoughts, a fellow peer consequently evaluates them and harbors an instilled belief about them.  From the extent of the multiple evaluations expressed, one can infer how he or she is perceived in a social setting.  If he or she is perceived in a positive way, his or her self-esteem will improve, just as their self-esteem would plummet in the presence of a negative review.  Due to self-esteem’s ability to dictate the mental condition and potential success of an individual, it is morally significant. 
            In efforts to maintain a positive level of self-esteem, an individual must obtain a positive image to be perceived in a positive way by his or her peers.  A significant way to facilitate this ideal is through purchases.    Appearance is held on the same level as skill in the realm of employment.  This fixation with appearance has been taken so seriously that employers have denied applicants work on the basis of how they look.  In a study done by the Employment Law Alliance, 33% surveyed reported of experiencing appearance discrimination from a potential employee.  In addition, 33% of current employees reported that the physically appealing workers were more likely to be given a raise or promoted in the workplace.  The very purchases that we condemn as excessive have the potential to excel us in our social standing and consequently improve our self-esteem.  For example, the man dressed in a Jhane Barnes suit, with Rockport Wingtips and a Movado watch is perceived very differently than the same man dressed in attire of lesser quality.  As employers perceive us in a more positive standing as a result of our possessions, our self-esteem improves.  Appearance in the work place is confined example of how purchases can positively effect how we are perceived in society because the external evaluations we receive from peers occur everywhere.  Since our culture places such an emphasis on expensive goods of the material nature, such as clothing, lavish houses, expensive cars, and general displays of wealth, purchases that we make are essential to our well-being. 
            Although spending to maintain self-esteem may make sense to some, critics and skeptics may wonder when it’s “enough.”  In clearer terms, the main criticism of this theory is that there is no limit to the extent of spending.  This skepticism implies rampant spending and a disregard for all acts of charity, but this is far from the truth.  In efforts to limit the spending to a somewhat reasonable rate, regulations need to be applied to spending for reasons of self-esteem.  First, we need to define the group of people that the individual is aiming to receive positive feedback from.  The subject group must consist of family members and colleagues from work.  Trying to seek the positive approval of a group larger than this would be unrealistic and undermine the process of making these purchases.  Realistically speaking, there is always someone more wealthy and, therefore, more able to make purchases that we brand as lavish.  It is unrealistic to try to seek the approval of someone with this wealth because their own fiscal status would desensitize them to whatever appeal an individual would make to them.  In addition, the point of making these purchases in context to maintaining self-esteem is to receive constant recognition and praise for them.  In the absence of the constant external approval and endorsement of these purchases, they are meaningless and then can be ruled as wasteful.  By identifying the target audience of which the audience should seek approval from, the purchases become justifiable.
            In addition to the target audience, the extent of spending needs to be established in order to avoid waste.  As mentioned before, the end result of the purchases made should be an elevated level of self-esteem due to the praise and recognition of the target audience.  Therefore, the extent of the increased spending should cease after the recognition the individual seeks is fulfilled.  Although this seems vague, the subjectivity of this principle is necessary because not every individual is seeking the same thing.  All individuals are making these purchases with respect to self-esteem but their ulterior motives are different.  While one individual seeks to be revered in the workplace, another seeks to be admired amongst family.  With the contingent regulations on the purchases in the pursuit of self-esteem, these morally significant expenditures seem less radical and controversial. 
Contrary to the view of critics, expenditures and charity can coexist.  Even though I support purchases in efforts to attain and maintain self-esteem, I am not opposed to Singer’s claim.  By branding self-esteem as morally significant, it is defended by Singer’s claim and can operate under his parameters.  After individuals make purchases, including those in pursuit and maintenance of self-esteem, they can donate to charity and help those in need.  The only significance of including self-esteem that is discontinuous with Singer’s original views of moral significance is that purchases made in respect to this principle cannot be put in jeopardy.  Since charity and purchases in the pursuit self-esteem can coexist, it is a feasible decision for individuals to support in context to our current society.

Work Cited:
“Maslow’s Theory of Motivation – Hierarchy of Needs.” Envision Software Incorporated. Envision Software Incorporated, 10 Apr. 2009. Web. 5 Feb 2011.
Price, Allen. “Appearance-based Discrimination.” US Human Resources. HRM Guide, 21 Jan. 2008. Web. 5 Feb. 2011.
Singer, Peter. Famine, Affluence, and Morality. New York: McGraw Hill, 2007. Print.